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1 Introduction 
 
There is a large literature on whether immigrants in the U.S. today are assimilating at the 
same speed and through the same processes as immigrants in the past.  Much of this 
literature either directly or implicitly points to the importance of social integration in their 
economic assimilation.  Because the racial and educational composition of the newest 
wave of immigration differs so much from the native population, an important question is 
whether this social integration is becoming more difficult. 
  
Traditionally, social scientists have measured social integration using residential 
segregation [for example, Duncan and Lieberson (1959) and Lazear (1999)].  However, a 
growing number of papers consider a different measure: interethnic marriage.  This 
paper examines the effect of education on intermarriage and specifically, whether the 
mechanisms through which education affects intermarriage depend on how assimilated a 
person is and his or her race.   
 
In a series of papers, Borjas (1992, 1995, 1998, 2006) shows theoretically and 
empirically how ethnic capital, or the average skill level in an ethnic group, affects the 
productivity of workers in the next generation.  He finds that although part of this human 
capital externality is simply a proxy for the average human capital in the neighborhoods 
in which the children of immigrants grow up, ethnic capital also has its own independent 
effect (Borjas, 1995).  Children growing up in the same neighborhood may have different 
outcomes depending on their ethnic group simply because they are more exposed to 
people who share their ethnic background.   
 
As suggested by Borjas’ work, immigrants choose with whom to associate.  Since these 
choices could potentially depend on their levels of human capital, it is important to 
examine how education affects ethnic attachment.  If, for example, immigrants with high 
education levels do not associate with co-ethnics, then they will not be affected by the 
ethnic externality and their human capital will not contribute to the externality.  We show 
in this paper that the relationship between education and ethnic attachment also depends 
on the average skill level of a person’s ethnic group as well as his degree of assimilation 
and race.  
 
This paper measures a person’s ethnic attachment by looking at whom he decides to 
marry. Certainly, inhabitants of ethnic enclaves have many fellow ethnics in their social 
circles and so are more likely to marry someone with the same ancestry even just by 
chance. At the same time, the ethnic preferences of people living far from an enclave yet 
remaining closely attached to their ethnic groups, can still be captured by their marriage 
to someone of the same ethnicity.  In fact, because communication and transportation 
costs have decreased so much in the past century, the ethnic composition of one's 
neighborhood may have become relatively less important in predicting the ethnic 
composition of one's social circle.  Surely, marriage to someone from the same country of 
origin remains an important measure of ethnic attachment since it is not only a result of 
  2having many fellow ethnics in one’s social circle, but also a cause.  In fact, intermarriage 
has been referred to as the “final step” in the immigrant assimilation process (Gordon 
1964).   
 
Ethnic intermarriage has long been studied by sociologists,
1 but a growing number of 
economists have also started considering its causes and consequences.  Bisin and Verdier 
(2000) present a theoretical analysis of the role of an ethnic group's share of the 
population on intermarriage decisions while Furtado (2006) examines the mechanisms 
through which education affects intermarriage.  Meng and Gregory’s (2001) paper on the 
causal effects of intermarriage on earnings of immigrants in Australia led to similar 
analyses for the U.S. (Kantaravic, 2004) and France (Meng and Meurs, 2006). Using 
various identification strategies, Furtado (2007), van Ours and Veenman (2007) and 
Celikaksoy et al. (2006) as well as Skyt Nielsen et al. (2007) examine the effects of 
intermarriage on education levels of immigrants or their children in the U.S., the 
Netherlands, and Denmark, respectively. Another paper (Duncan and Trejo, 2006), uses 
the negative relationship between human capital and intermarriage rates for Mexican 
Americans along with the finding that children with intermarried parents are less likely to 
be identified as Mexican to suggest that observed measures of intergenerational progress 
for Mexican Americans may be biased. Card et al. (2000) use intermarriage rates as a 
measure of intergenerational assimilation rates of immigrants. Angrist (2002) uses 
changes in immigration policy in the U.S. as a source of exogenous variation to explain 
the endogamy rates of second-generation immigrants in the U.S.  
 
Adapted from Wong’s (2003) explanations for the scarcity of black-white interracial 
marriages, Furtado (2006) presents three mechanisms through which education could 
affect marriage choice: the cultural adaptability effect, the enclave effect, and the 
assortative matching effect.  The cultural adaptability effect assumes that people prefer to 
match with someone who shares a similar culture.  As did Lazear (1999), we think of 
culture as a “notion of shared values, beliefs, expectations, customs, jargon, and rituals.”    
The cultural adaptability effect suggests that educated people are better able to adapt to 
different customs or to communicate their potentially different expectations and beliefs to 
their spouses.  Because of this better "technology" for adapting to a different culture, they 
become more likely to marry outside of their ethnic group.   
 
 
The enclave effect suggests that the educated are less likely to live in ethnic enclaves 
because, for example, they have larger geographic labor markets.  If there are fewer co-
ethnics within close geographic proximity, the probability of encountering an acceptable 
same-ethnicity spouse purely by random chance decreases and thus the costs of meeting 
someone with the same ethnic background increases.  This could be a reason why the 
educated are less likely to marry endogamously.      
 
                                                 
1 See among others, Fu (2001); Kalmijn (1991, 1993, 1998); Lee and Edmonston (2005); Lewis and 
Oppenheimer (2000); Lichter et al. (1992); Lichter et al. (2007), Liebrson and Waters (1988); Model and 
Fisher (2001); Pagnini and Morgan (1990); Qian (1997); Qian and Lichter (2001); Qian et al. (2001).   
  3Lastly, consistent with both the Becker (1973) and Lam (1988) theories described above, 
the assortative matching effect posits that marriage surplus increases when education 
levels of husband and wife are similar. This implies that given a costly search process, 
educated immigrants may be willing to substitute similarities in ethnicity for similarities 
in education.   
 
Incorporating these theories, Furtado (2006) develops a model of assortative matching 
which predicts that an increase in education for immigrants in highly educated ethnic 
groups should actually decrease the likelihood of intermarriage while the opposite is true 
for immigrants in low education ethnicities. By the cultural adaptability mechanism, 
however, education always increases the probability of intermarriage.   
 
Using 1970 U.S. Census data, Furtado (2006) finds that, controlling for the enclave 
effect, assortative matching is more important than cultural adaptability in explaining 
marriage choices of second-generation immigrants.  This conclusion may not be 
applicable today because the composition of immigrants has since changed so 
dramatically.  First, immigrants and their children make up a larger proportion of the U.S. 
population.  In 1970, 16.5 percent of the population was either foreign born or had at 
least one foreign born parent while in 2000, the figure increased to 20.4 percent.  In 1980, 
the proportion foreign born was 6.2 percent, but grew to 10.4 percent by 2000, the 
highest proportion since 1930 (Schmidley, 2001).  A continuously replenished supply of 
potential same-ethnicity spouses could certainly affect marriage decisions.   
 
Moreover, newer cohorts of immigrants have very different levels of education than 
natives. Although they are just as likely as natives to have a bachelor’s degree or above, 
immigrants are much less likely to have a high school diploma and are significantly less 
likely to have graduated the 9th grade (Larsen, 2004).   Also, immigrants today have a 
very different racial composition. In 1970, the great majority of immigrants were from 
Europe. Today, while a little over half of the foreign born are from Latin America and a 
quarter are Asian (Larsen, 2004), only about 12.5 percent of the U.S. population is 
Hispanic and 3.6 percent is Asian (Grieco and Cassidy, 2001).   
 
A direct comparison between second-generation immigrants in 1970 and 2000 is not 
possible because 1970 was the last year the Census asked for parents’ country of birth.  
However, this paper first tests whether the conclusions drawn for second-generation 
immigrants in 1970 apply to all people that list at least one ancestry in the 2000 Census.  
Next, we examine how assimilation affects the relationship between education and 
intermarriage decisions by, first, running the analysis separately on the native-born and 
foreign born.   Then, for the foreign born, we look at how age at migration affects 
marriage decisions.  This paper also adds race to the study of intermarriage.  Even though 
they are becoming more frequent, interracial marriages are still relatively rare. 
Preferences for marriage within one's race may change the relative importance of the 
cultural adaptability and assortative matching effects.   
 
Using U.S. Census data, we find that even after controlling for the enclave effect, there is 
evidence for both the cultural adaptability and assortative matching effects. As one may 
expect, the cultural adaptability effect is relatively more important for the foreign born 
  4than for the native-born. Assortative matching is relatively more important for 
immigrants that are less attached to the U.S., as measured by their age at arrival. There 
are also significant differences by race in the relative importance of education in 
endogamy. More specifically, assortative matching plays a greater role in the marriage 
decisions of Asians than of Hispanics.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that relative to low education racial groups, groups that place a high value on education 
tend to prefer similarities in education with their spouses over similarities in ethnicity.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methods used 
in the paper. The data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results, while Section 5 presents results from a different approach 
for arriving at the same conclusions.  Section 6 concludes.      
 
2  Theoretical Background and Methods 
 
As discussed in the introduction, there are three mechanisms through which education 
could affect marriage decisions.  By cultural adaptability, education makes people more 
accepting of differences in others, and so regardless of their ethnic group, more education 
decreases the probability of marrying within ethnicity.  By the enclave effect, an increase 
in education results in moving away from ethnic enclaves.  When the proportion of same-
ethnicity potential spouses living within close geographic proximity decreases, the costs 
associated with finding a same ethnicity spouse increases.  We can capture this idea by 
controlling for the size of the person’s ethnic group living in his city.  By the assortative 
matching effect, an increase in education will lead to an increase in endogamy for people 
living in cities where the average education in their ethnic groups is above the average in 
the general population.  For people in low education groups, an increase in education will 
lead to a decrease in endogamy. All of these ideas are incorporated into the following 
empirical specification:   
 
  ijk j ijk jk jk ak jk ijk ijk ijk X p p h h h h y ε γ β β β β β β + + + + + − + + = 5
2
4 3 2 1 0
* ) (  
  
where   denotes net utility from marriage within ethnicity for person i in ethnicity j 
living in geographical area k.  Years of schooling is denoted h. Average schooling in 
ethnic group j in city k is denoted 
*
ijk y
jk h while  ak h  measures the average schooling of the 
general population in city k.  Ethnic group size is denoted   while X is a vector of 
characteristics which capture tastes for marrying within ethnicity, such as age, language 
ability, and whether the person lives in the central part of the city.  If education affects 
endogamy through the cultural adaptability mechanism, then we expect that β
p
1 is 
negative.  If education affects endogamy through the assortative matching mechanism, 
then we expect that β2 is positive.  Although we do not have a direct measure for the 
enclave effect, we control for it by including p and its square in the specification.    
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education and preferences for endogamy.  For a variety of reasons, some ethnic groups 
may have fewer cultural differences with the average American and so it may be easier 
for them to share a household with an American.  Also, some ethnic groups have a long 
history of immigration to the US (for example, Mexicans) while others had a big wave of 
immigration at a certain time and then immigration stopped rather suddenly (for example, 
Italians). This history of immigration from a certain country could affect its social 
institutions in the U.S. Social institutions such as festivals and social clubs may make 
finding an acceptable ethnic spouse easier.  In order to capture all of these effects, ethnic 
group fixed effects, denoted γ, are included in the model.   
 
We do not observe  directly, but rather , which takes on values of 0 and 1 according 
to  
*
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We also assume ( )
2 , 0 ~ σ ε N ijk .  Thus, we use the probit model in estimating our 
coefficients of interest.   
 
 
The relative importance of the different mechanisms linking education to endogamy rates 
could differ by immigrant generation.  One would expect that with more attachment to 
the U.S., similarities in education with a potential spouse should become relatively more 
important than similarities in ethnic traits.  Thus, the coefficient capturing the assortative 
matching effect, 2 β , will be greater for the native-born than for the foreign born.   
Predictions for the coefficient measuring cultural adaptability,  1 β , are more difficult to 
make.  With more assimilation, ethnic preferences should decrease.  Thus, it could be that 
education has less of an effect on marriage decisions and so  1 β  will decrease in 
magnitude.  In the extreme case, if people have no preference for marrying within 
ethnicity, education certainly cannot decrease this preference.   On the other hand, if 
ethnic preferences are strong enough, they may not be sensitive to education and again, 
1 β  may be very close to zero.   
 
Comparing the native-born to the foreign born is a rather crude method for evaluating the 
effect of assimilation on marriage patterns.  A more precise measure of assimilation, at 
least for the foreign born, would be years since migration. However, it is impossible with 
our data set to establish years since migration at the time immigrants were making 
marriage decisions.  Moreover, it is difficult to determine whether the foreign born 
arrived in the U.S. already married.  Instead, we compare marriage patterns of 
immigrants that arrived at different ages, limiting our analysis to those that arrived under 
the age of 18, and thus most likely unmarried.   
 
  6Using U.S. data, Friedberg (1993) and Borjas (1995) find that age at arrival has a 
negative effect on earnings even after controlling for several demographics.
2  There is a 
large psychology literature which finds that because of physiological changes in the 
brain, age at arrival in a new country is critical for the language acquisition of immigrants 
[see Bleakley and Chin (2007) for references].  There is also a large literature which links 
language acquisition to many other measures of assimilation and so we feel justified in 
using age at arrival as a proxy for assimilation.  We compare marriage patterns of 
immigrants that came when they were younger than five to the immigrants that arrived 
between the ages of 14 and 16. Both sets of immigrants were very likely exposed to the 
U.S. marriage market, but those that came very young probably value shared ethnicity 
with their spouses less than those that arrived as teenagers.  As described above, our main 
hypothesis is that the assortative matching coefficient, 2 β , is larger in magnitude for the 
immigrants that arrived at a young age.   Although our predictions for  1 β are not perfectly 
clear, we suspect that the ethnic preferences of childhood immigrants are not immutable 
and so  1 β  will be smaller in magnitude for immigrants that arrived at a younger age.   
 
Race may also affect the mechanisms through which education affects endogamy 
decisions. Since so many of the new immigrants are either Hispanic or Asian, we 
consider their marriages in particular.  Although certain Asian and Hispanic ethnic 
groups have a long history of migration to the U.S., the level of migration has never been 
what it is today. This continued migration from Asia and Latin America replenishes 
marriage markets making it easier for native born racial minorities to find acceptable 
same-race foreign born spouses.  In fact, intermarriage between natives and foreign born 
minorities increased in the 1990s while interracial marriages between Latinos and Whites 
and Asians and Whites decreased a bit (Bean and Stevens, 2003).   
 
The model sociologists typically use to explain interracial marriages is Merton’s (1940) 
social exchange theory.  Put simply, the theory is that whites bare a cost for marrying a 
lower status racial group, and so will only intermarry if they are compensated with some 
other favourable characteristic in a spouse, such as income or education.  One prediction 
of the theory is that black males with high socioeconomic status will marry whites with 
lower socioeconomic status.   Although the model seems to work reasonably well for 
black-white marriages,
3 the model is not as successful in explaining who marries whom 
in Hispanic and Asian marriages.  In fact, there is more endogamy for high education 
Asians than low education Asians (Qian, 1997).  Also, the white men that marry Asian 
women have higher levels of education than the Asian men that marry Asian women 
(Qian, 1997).  
 
                                                 
2 Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) conclude the same thing using Canadian data.  Reasons they present for 
this negative relationship between age at immigration and earnings include 1) schooling and work 
experience in the home country do not have as high returns in the host country 2) older immigrants face 
more difficulty in dealing with the linguistic and cultural changes and 3) education in the host country 
decreases with age at arrival and this leads to an indirect effect on earnings.   
3 Fryer (2007) interprets the finding that blacks who intermarry have less education than those who 
intramarry as evidence against the social exchange theory.   
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consistent with the data on interracial marriages (Fryer, 2007).  Applying the marriage 
market model to interracial marriages, Fryer concludes that if interracial marriage is 
costly and education in a spouse is important, then interracial marriages may be 
infrequent, but those that intermarry will be the highly educated.    
 
Using this basic framework, we can make predictions about the mechanisms through 
which education affects endogamy separately for Whites, Hispanics, and Asians.  It is 
useful to keep in mind that because the majority of the U.S. population is non-Hispanic 
white, a decision not to marry within ethnicity for Hispanics and Asians, often implies an 
interracial marriage.  Our main hypothesis is that racial groups that place a higher value 
on educational attainment may prefer similarities in education with their spouses over 
similarities in ancestry.  The Asian ethnic economy highly rewards education gains in 
Asian children (Qian et al., 2001), while Hispanics lag behind other races in educational 
attainment (Lichter et al., 2007).  This suggests that assortative matching on education is 
most important for Asians, followed by Whites and then Hispanics.  Thus, we expect that 
2 β  is greatest for Asians, followed by Whites and then Hispanics.  
 
Without insight into the differential social costs to interracial marriage or the relationship 
between education and these social costs, predictions concerning the cultural adaptability 
effect are more difficult.
4  In fact, the impact of education on interracial marriage 
decisions of Asians is weakest for the Japanese, most assimilated ethnic group, and the 
Southeast Asians, least assimilated Asian group (Qian, 1997).  This is consistent with the 
Japanese having little preference for endogamous marriage and so education cannot have 
a substantial effect while Southeast Asians have such a strong preference for endogamy 
that education does not have a strong effect.  We do not feel comfortable in making any 
predictions about the magnitude of  1 β  for different racial groups.  
 
3  The Data  
 
The analysis uses the 5 percent public use sample of the 2000 U.S. Census as reported by 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al., 2004).
5  This data 
set is particularly well suited for our purposes because it allows us to get reasonably 
accurate counts of the number of immigrants from a specific country of origin living 
within close geographic proximity.    
 
The initial sample is restricted to married males with a spouse present living in a 
metropolitan area. We drop married men with spouses away from home. We examine 
individuals that are legally married only since Census data do not allow us to accurately 
                                                 
4 There is some evidence that the social costs of marrying whites may be higher for Asians than Hispanics 
(Lichter, Brown, Qian, Carmalt 2007).  In fact, interracial marriages between Asians and Whites were 
banned in many states, but marriages between Hispanics and whites have never been illegal (Fryer 2007).  
5 The dataset is publicly available at http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. 
  8analyze cohabitating couples.
6 In order to limit the possibility of reverse causality 
between education and endogamy, only those over the age of 25 and not enrolled in 
school are used in the analysis.  Even without putting this restriction on the data, only 15 
percent of all married people acquire more education post-marriage (Oppenheimer, 
2000). People over the age of 65 are also eliminated from the sample because marriage 
market conditions may have changed substantially from the time they were making 
marriage decisions.  Only ancestry groups from non-English speaking countries and with 
more than 1,000 observations are considered in the analysis.   
 
 
A marriage is considered endogamous if spouses share a common ancestry. Census 
respondents were allowed to write in as many as two ancestries. Our dependent variable 
takes the value of one if the first ancestry of the husband is the same as the first ancestry 
listed by the wife and zero otherwise. In the 2000 Census, education is measured in 
academic qualifications and not in years of schooling. We construct the continuous years 
of schooling by mapping educational qualifications into the average number of years it 
takes for people to complete them, following Chiswick and DebBurman (2004).  The size 
of the ethnic group is obtained by dividing the number of people from that ethnic group 
residing in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) by the MSA population. We count 
both populations using the appropriate person weights. To limit sampling error in the 
formation of these variables, observations are dropped if there are fewer than 50 people 
from a person’s ethnic group living in the MSA.   
 
The controls used in the analysis are language ability, age, age squared, residence in the 
center city, veteran status, region of residence, and race.  A series of dummy variables is 
used to measure the individual’s language ability.   
 
Because around three quarters of the foreign born are either Hispanic or Asian, we 
include dummy variables for being Hispanic or Asian in the baseline regressions.  The 
racial categories are based on self-responses in census questionnaires.  Although Hispanic 
was not listed as a race in the Census form, we coded respondents as Hispanic if they 
answered yes to the Hispanic question, regardless of how they answered the race 
question.  Because there are not enough immigrant Blacks we drop individuals with 
Black race from the sample. Also, people who report more than one race are dropped 
from the sample.   
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for males in endogamous and exogamous marriages 
separately.  Intermarried males have more years of schooling, belong to high-skilled 
ethnic groups, and live in cities with a smaller proportion of people with the same 
ancestry.  They are more likely to be native born, speak English well, and have fought in 
a war, but are less likely to live in the central part of the city.  Table 2 shows endogamy 
rates, ethnic group sizes, and average education levels by ancestry.  Endogamy rates are 
higher for groups that are racial minorities and for groups that are highly represented in 
the cities in which members of the group reside.    
                                                 
6 Qian and Lichter (2007) suggest that there is little evidence that cohabitation has become a substitute for 
marriage for interracial couples.  
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4  Empirical Results   
 
Table 3 presents probit estimates of the marginal effects of education on endogamy. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within MSA-ancestry cells. All specifications 
include a set of controls to capture ethnic preferences.  Coefficients on the controls have 
the expected signs: The inability to speak English well increases endogamy while being 
born in the U.S. decreases endogamy. Perhaps because the military exposes its members 
to people from many different backgrounds, veteran status decreases endogamy. Also, 
perhaps because preferences for marriage within ethnicity have decreased over the past 
century, older people are more likely to be in endogamous marriages, although this effect 
is not linear.  These results are consistent with Fryer’s (2007) findings that veterans and 
younger people are more likely to be in interracial marriages. Because ethnic enclaves 
tend to be located in center cities, residence in the central part of a city tends to increase 
endogamy. Residing in an ethnic enclave makes it easier to meet potential spouses of the 
same ethnicity. Moreover, people with greater preferences for ethnic endogamy are more 
likely to live in ethnic enclaves. Racial minorities are more endogamous than non-
Hispanic Whites.  Eight region dummies are also included in all specifications.  
 
Table 3 shows that even with this set of controls, a one year increase in schooling is 
associated with a one percentage point decrease in the probability of marrying someone 
with the same ancestry. As discussed in the previous section, this coefficient on education 
is an average effect of the different mechanisms through which education could affect 
endogamy decisions. By adding the size of the ethnic group living in a person’s city, we 
control for the possibility that people with more education are less likely to live in ethnic 
enclaves and so even by random matching, they may become less likely to marry 
endogamously. Column 2 shows that the marginal effect of education is almost cut in half 
when measures for the size of the ethnic group are added to the specification. This 
suggests that the enclave effect is an important mechanism through which education 
affects endogamy.  As expected, an increase in the size of the ethnic group results in an 
increase in endogamy.   
 
In Column 3, the assortative matching effect is accounted for by adding the interaction of 
education and the difference between average ethnic education and average education of 
Americans in the person’s city. When this measure of the availability of co-ethnics with a 
similar education is included in the analysis, the marginal effect of education alone stays 
about the same while the marginal effect of the interaction has the expected positive sign. 
Taken together, these marginal effects suggest that although education in general has a 
negative effect on endogamy, more education tends to decrease endogamy more for 
people living in areas where average ethnic education is lower than the average American 
education.  Conversely, for people living in areas where ethnics have higher education 
levels than others in the local population, an increase in education leads to a smaller 
decrease in endogamy.  In fact, for people in ethnic groups with very high average levels 
of education relative to the general population, an increase in education can lead to an 
increase in endogamy. We interpret this result as evidence of assortative matching on 
education in the marriage market.  
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There are other measures of the availability of same-ethnicity spouses with a similar level 
of education, for the proportion of all people with the same level of education that share 
the same ancestry.  Using this proxy instead of the education interaction to measure 
assortative matching, does not change the qualitative results of our analysis. Further, one 
may believe that much of the assortative matching result is driven by college completion.  
We ran a specification adding an interaction between college completion and our 
assortative matching interaction.   As expected, the triple interaction had the significant 
and positive effect suggesting that college completers may have a strong preference for 
marrying other college graduates.  However, they are not the only drivers of the 
assortative matching effect since the original interaction remains significant.   
    
 
Ancestry fixed effects are added in Column 4. Instead of exploiting variation in average 
education levels across ethnic groups and across cities, we look within ethnic groups to 
see how the effect of education responds to differences in relative education levels 
between ethnics and natives across different cities (see Brien, 1997). Note that the 
marginal effects of education alone and the interaction remain approximately the same.  
 
We conclude that there is support for all three mechanisms through which education 
affects endogamy.  For the typical Mexican, either native-born or foreign-born, living in 
an MSA where Mexicans have two fewer years of education less than the population in 
general, an increase in education by one year, leads to a .009 percentage point decrease in 
the probability of marrying another Mexican.  If that Mexican were to move to city where 
Mexicans had the same average education as natives, then the decrease in endogamy 
would only be by .005 percentage points.   
 
A potential problem with this analysis is that people choose where to live.  Conceivably, 
there could be a relationship between own education and the average ability of co-ethnics 
where a person chooses to live, and this relationship could be correlated with ethnic 
preferences in a manner which could bias the assortative matching coefficient. 
Presumably, average education in one’s ethnic group in the entire country is more 
exogenous in that people cannot choose it.  We ran a regression exploiting only 
differences in average education levels across ancestries and results did not change 
qualitatively. Of course, this method of identification is also problematic because we 
cannot control for ethnicity fixed effects.  Thus, unobservable preferences for endogamy 
which vary by ancestry and are correlated with the ethnic group’s average education may 
lead to biased results. In order to be problematic, ethnic groups with both very high and 
very low average levels of education would need to have the highest unobservable ethnic 
preferences.  Since this is a possibility, caution must be used in interpreting coefficients 
in specifications without ethnicity fixed effects.  Still, even though both methods of 
identification are imperfect, they are imperfect for different reasons, so the fact that 
results are robust is very comforting.  
 
 
  11As discussed in Furtado (2006), another potential concern in this analysis lies with the 
interpretation of the size of the ethnic group in an MSA as a measure of the ease at which 
spouse-searchers meet potential spouses with the same ancestry.  There are two problems 
with this: First, we measure the size of the ethnic group in the person’s MSA of residence 
at the time of the survey as opposed to the time and place where the person was actually 
searching for a spouse.  Since location decisions of couples may be affected by their 
marriage decisions, coefficients may be biased. Second, even if we could measure the 
size of the ethnic group at the right time and place, ethnics with higher preferences for 
endogamy are more likely to live in ethnic enclaves while searching for a spouse.  Thus, 
the coefficient on the size of the ethnic group would be measuring both opportunity and 
preferences for intramarriage. Since the focus of this paper is on disentangling the 
cultural adaptability effect from the assortative matching effect while controlling for the 
enclave effect as well as preferences, the second issue is not so much of a problem for our 
purposes.  Nevertheless, we deal with both of these concerns, at least for the native born 
population, by calculating the size of the ethnic group in people’s state of birth as 
opposed to MSA of current residence. Since one’s state of birth is chosen by one’s 
parents, it is arguably less endogenous to marriage choice.  Moreover, it certainly is not 
subject to reverse causality concerns. Qualitative results did not change when this 
different measure was used. When using state of birth as opposed to current residence, we 
are not controlling for the enclave effect and so this is not our preferred specification.  
However, knowledge that our coefficients of interest are not sensitive to our measure of 
opportunity makes us less concerned about endogeneity biases.      
 
The results in Table 3 show how education affects marriage decisions for all people that 
list at least one ancestry in the Census.  However, the relative importance of the different 
mechanisms through which education affects endogamy could differ depending on how 
assimilated a person is to the U.S. culture. Table 4 shows the final specification 
separately for the native born and for immigrants that arrive in the U.S. at different ages.  
Specifically, Column 1 limits the sample to the native born while Column 2 includes only 
the foreign born.  Column 3 presents results for the foreign born that arrived in the U.S. 
below the age of five. Column 4 limits the sample to the foreign born that arrived 
between the ages of 14 and 16, inclusively.  The last column includes immigrants that 
arrived as adults.   
 
The interpretation of the coefficients is difficult for both of these samples.  The native 
born sample includes second-generation immigrants, whose parents may have arrived in 
the U.S. only shortly before they were born, as well as people whose families have been 
in the country for several generations.  On the other hand, the immigrant sample surely 
includes immigrants that arrived in the U.S. already married and so their marriage 
decisions would not be as influenced by the educational distribution of potential spouses 
in the U.S.   
 
 
As expected, the relative importance of assortative matching is higher for populations 
with greater attachment to the U.S.  Although the coefficient on education alone is the 
same for the native (Column 1) and foreign born (Column 2), the coefficient on the 
  12interaction is quadruple the size for the native born as it is for the foreign born.     
Education decreases ethnic preferences for members of both groups, but relative to 
similarities in ethnic background, natives value similarities in education more than 
immigrants.   
 
Interestingly, as seen in Column 3, there is no support for the cultural adaptability effect 
for immigrants that arrive very young while there is support for the assortative matching.  
 
This is consistent with Furtado (2006) who found no evidence for the cultural 
adaptability effect for second-generation immigrants, the native-born children of 
immigrants, with two foreign born parents. Conversely, for immigrants that arrive as 
teenagers, there is no support for the importance of assortative matching, but education 
does seem to decrease preferences for marriage within ethnicity.  Immigrants that came 
as adults are more likely to have come already married and so it is reasonable that 
coefficients on all education variables are closer to zero.   
 
To limit concerns that the foreign born, specifically those that arrived as adults, came 
already married, we use two different techniques.  First, we dropped couples where 
husband and wife arrived in the same year.  We also drop couples whose eldest child 
living in the household is not native born.  Results are robust to limiting the sample in 
these ways.    
 
In the last great wave of immigration, immigrants were predominantly from European 
countries and so were of the same race as most natives.  Today about half of the foreign 
born are Hispanic and about a quarter are Asian.  The marriage patterns of people with 
different races may respond differently to changes in education.  Table 5 presents results 
separately by racial group and nativity.   
 
Relative to foreign born Asians, the coefficient on education alone is larger than the 
coefficient on the education interaction for foreign born Hispanics. This is consistent with 
the idea that people in racial groups that are highly education-oriented, such as Asians, 
may value the education of their spouses relatively more than the ethnicity of their 
spouses.   Also, as we may expect, assortative matching is relatively more important than 
cultural adaptability for native born Whites than for native born Hispanics.  Results for 
native born Asians, however, are more difficult to interpret.  For them, an increase in 
education leads to an increase in endogamy in general, but this increase is lower for 
Asians in areas where Asians have much higher education levels relative to the general 
population.  Robustness checks suggest that this result is driven by the Chinese and 
Japanese since coefficients have the usual pattern when these two groups are dropped 
from the sample.  We suspect that this result is mainly driven by differences in Asian 




  135 A Different Approach to Inferring Preferences for 
Ethnic Endogamy and Assortative Matching  
 
The results of this analysis suggest that there is a role for both the cultural adaptability 
and the assortative matching effects in marriage markets.  We provide evidence that 
assortative matching is relatively more important for the native born than the foreign 
born.  It is also more important for the foreign born that arrived young and for racial 
groups that are very education-oriented.  In this section, we present a different technique 
for testing the assortative matching hypothesis.  After establishing the importance of 
similarities in education in evaluating potential spouses, we introduce a method for 
inferring relative preferences for endogamy of different groups.  Results provide a 
context for interpreting the relationships between the coefficients found in the previous 
section.   
 
The main idea behind the assortative matching effect is that people value similarities in 
education levels with their spouses.  Because demands for many household public goods 
are affected by people’s education and ethnicity
7, in order to take full advantage of 
household public goods (Lam, 1988) spouse-searchers may want to marry someone with 
the same ancestry and level of education.  However, if search is costly (as in, Furtado 
2006), marriage market participants may be willing to marry someone with a different 
level of education but the same ancestry or someone with the same education level but a 
different ancestry.  This implies that at equilibrium, the absolute value of the difference in 
spousal education levels should be greater for intramarried couples than intermarried 
couples.
8 Moreover, the difference in spousal education differences between endogamous 
and exogamous couples should be greater for groups with higher ethnic preferences.  In 
other words, the greater the importance of ethnic endogamy, the more of an education 
difference one is willing to tolerate in a spouse.   
 
To test these hypotheses, we focus on a sample which is most likely to have high 
preferences for both ethnic endogamy and assortative matching on education:  the foreign 
born that arrived before the age of 14.  These immigrants were certainly exposed to the 
U.S. marriage market.  Because they are foreign born, they most likely have high ethnic 
preferences.  However, since they came at a young age, they do not face the language and 
cultural barriers in marrying outside of their ethnic group.  Table 6 shows average 
(absolute values of) spousal differences in years of schooling by marriage type.  As 
predicted, there are bigger educational differences between spouses in endogamous 
marriages than exogamous marriages.   
 
Although we do not have data on ethnic preferences, we argue that certain categories of 
immigrants have higher ethnic preferences.  Specifically, immigrants that arrived older, 
with poorer English skills, and living in ethnic enclaves presumably have the highest 
                                                 
7 For example, demand for vacations to homeland will certainly be affected by ancestry.  Also, demand for 
visits to museums or even ‘intellectual conversations” could be affected by education.   
8 This assumes that the education distributions are very similar across ethnic groups.  If they are different, 
then just by random matching, endogamous marriages should have smaller spousal differences in 
education.  This makes our test for assortative matching even stronger.      
  14preferences for ethnic endogamy.  Thus, they should be willing to sacrifice the most in 
terms of educational similarities with their spouses.  Table 6 presents average spousal 
educational differences separately by whether immigrants arrived before or after the age 
of seven.  Consistent with the assortative matching hypothesis, intermarried couples have 
smaller differences in their years of schooling.  Consistent with the hypothesis that older 
arriving immigrants have greater preferences for endogamy, the difference between 
endogamous and exogamous couples is greatest for immigrants that arrived older.   
Similarly, spousal differences in education are relatively greater in endogamous couples 
than exogamous couples for immigrants with poorer English skills.  
 
The size of one’s ethnic group living within close proximity has a theoretically 
ambiguous effect on the relationship between spousal educational differences and 
marriage type.  On the one hand, a greater availability of same-ancestry spouses makes it 
easier to find a spouse with the same ethnicity and education level.  On the other hand, 
immigrants with high ethnic preferences are more likely to live in ethnic enclaves.  Thus, 
we may expect the difference in spousal education differences between endogamous and 
exogamous marriages to be greatest for immigrants living in MSAs with high 
concentrations of people sharing their ethnic background.  Table 6 shows that, in fact, the 
greater availability of same-ethnicity spouses does not eliminate the need to sacrifice 
educational similarities for ethnic similarities.  The difference between endogamous and 
exogamous couples is greatest for people living in cities where more than seven percent 
of residents share the spouse-searcher’s ethnicity.
9   
 
Using this technique, we provide further evidence of our findings that racial groups that 
are more education oriented are more willing to sacrifice ethnic similarities for 
educational similarities in a spouse.    As can be seen in Table 6, the difference in spousal 
educational differences between endogamous and exogamous couples is smallest for 
Hispanics and greatest for Asians.  This is very consistent with the findings in the 
previous section that, controlling for the enclave effect, assortative matching on 
education is more important than the cultural adaptability effect for racial groups that are 
more education-oriented.    
 
       
6 Conclusions  
 
This paper provides evidence of three different mechanisms through which education 
affects interethnic marriage decisions.  On average, education decreases endogamy for all 
people that list an ancestry in the Census.  However, the negative relationship is not quite 
as strong after controlling for the probability of encountering someone with the same 
ethnic background.  This is consistent with the idea that people with more education are 
less likely to live in or near ethnic enclaves.  Lastly, we show that the availability of co-
ethnics with a similar level of education is also a very important determinant of 
interethnic marriage decisions, suggesting the importance of assortative matching on 
education.   
                                                 
9 Seven percent is the median value for the size of the ethnic group in the MSA for this sample.   
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The relative importance of these mechanisms differs for various populations.  Assortative 
matching on education is relatively more important for people that are more culturally 
and economically attached to the U.S.  Specifically, the native born seem to value 
similarities in education more than similarities in ethnicity relative to the foreign born.  
Also, assortative matching on education seems to be more important for immigrants that 
arrived in the U.S. at a young age.  Lastly, Asians seem to value similarities in education 
more than ethnicity relative to Whites and Hispanics while Whites value education more 
than Hispanics.  This is consistent with the idea that racial groups that are very education 
oriented, value a spouse’s education relatively more than her ancestry.   
 
We conclude that not only is education an important determinant of intermarriage 
decisions, but that there are several mechanisms linking education and spouse-choice and 
that relative importance of these mechanisms differs by nativity, race, and age at arrival 
for the foreign born.  If we assume that marriage to someone with a different ancestry is a 
measure of a person’s association with natives more generally, then there are several 
policy implications that might be drawn from this analysis.   
 
Point systems of immigration like those in Canada, in Australia, and recently in the UK, 
tend to put more weight on years of schooling and language ability than countries without 
a point system. Part of the rationale for is that more educated immigrants tend to 
assimilate economically and socially faster than non-educated immigrants.  This paper 
reinforces this idea by finding a generally negative relationship between education and 
ethnic endogamy.  Moreover, taken together with the Borjas ethnic externalities story, 
this implies an even slower rate of assimilation.  That is, if the more educated immigrants 
are less likely to associate with their ethnic group, then low education immigrants would 
not be benefiting from the high education of these ethnic peers but would be affected by 
their low education ethnic peers.   
 
Another important finding of this paper is that the effect of education differs by 
immigrant group.  In fact, for immigrants in high education groups living in areas with 
low-education Americans, more education may even lead to a decrease in social 
integration.  This implies that for certain high education ethnic groups, assimilation to 
U.S. average education levels may be slower than what is implied by the Borjas results.   
 
If the social integration of highly educated immigrants is a policy goal, our findings 
suggest that given two immigrants with the same education, more points should be given 
to the immigrant in the low education ethnic group.   In a similar way, the findings that 
the relative importance of assortative matching depends on race, nativity, and age at 
arrival can also inform policy discussions.   
 
The marriage patterns of immigrants and their progeny may also have direct effects on 
household fertility and employment decisions. These decisions, in turn, have affects on 
wages and schooling levels of both immigrants and the natives that compete with them.   
Further, assortative mating on education across interethnic marriages may even increase 
the inequality of investments in the human capital and values of the children of these 
  16marriages (Becker and Murphy, 2000). Thus, sorting on education, ethnicity, race and 
other characteristics in marriage is probably more important in transmitting inequality 
than capital market restrictions on investments in human capital, school and 
neighborhood segregation. We aim to explore should explore these additional important 
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APPENDIX A  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
   Exogamous Couples   Endogamous Couples   All 
   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
Years of Education  14.25 3.190 12.77 4.417 13.66  3.793
Age  45.14 9.856 44.71 10.077 44.97  9.946
Size of Ethnic Group in MSA   0.09 0.083 0.13 0.127 0.10  0.105
Mean Ethnic Education in MSA  14.15 1.420  13.06 2.301  13.71  1.896
Mean Education in MSA  13.79 0.611  13.61 0.757  13.72  0.678
Cannot Speak English  0.00 0.058 0.04 0.189 0.02  0.128
White 0.95 0.208  0.76 0.430  0.89  0.312
Asian 0.02 0.134  0.16 0.366  0.07  0.262
Hispanic 0.10 0.295  0.32 0.467  0.19  0.389
US born  0.90 0.301  0.53 0.499  0.75  0.431
Veteran 0.29 0.454  0.18 0.384 0.25  0.431
In Metro Area, Central City  0.12 0.322 0.19 0.390 0.14  0.352
In Metro Area, Outside Central City  0.51 0.500   0.46 0.498   0.49  0.500
Notes: Numbers are weighted. 
 
  22Table 2. Endogamy Rate, Size of Ethnic Group, and Average Education Level by 
Ancestry. 
Ancestry Endogamy 
Size of Ethnic Group 
in MSA  
Mean Ethnic 
Education in MSA  






born      
Austrian 0.039  0.031  0.106 0.003  15.85  13.89 
Belgian  0.094 0.061 0.305  0.008  14.76  13.81 
Danish 0.057  0.051  0.156 0.010  15.10  13.88 
Dutch  0.157 0.152 0.246  0.033  14.32  13.78 
Finnish 0.102  0.078  0.421 0.011  14.74  13.93 
French  0.148 0.142 0.246  0.032  13.98  13.75 
German  0.344 0.344 0.339  0.172  14.34  13.82 
Greek  0.291 0.132 0.602  0.007  14.24  13.90 
Irish  0.277 0.274 0.422  0.091  14.45  13.87 
Italian 0.289  0.269  0.550 0.102  14.17  13.88 
Norwegian  0.128 0.126 0.222  0.049  14.68  13.96 
Portuguese 0.404  0.162  0.725 0.059  11.90  13.58 
Swedish  0.086 0.081 0.244  0.022  14.94  13.89 
Swiss  0.085 0.067 0.259 0.005  15.34  13.81 
Czechoslovakian 0.088 0.066 0.411  0.007  15.02  13.84 
Hungarian  0.095 0.050 0.374  0.010  14.64  13.82 
Lithuanian 0.068  0.043 0.409  0.004  15.41  13.89 
Polish  0.230 0.173 0.746  0.055  14.43  13.86 
Russian  0.358 0.247 0.787  0.018  16.59  13.90 
Yugoslavian 0.214  0.031 0.557  0.001  13.90  13.72 
Spaniard  0.385 0.143 0.477  0.008  13.23  13.53 
Mexican  0.747 0.562 0.837  0.201  9.79  13.10 
Central American  0.621  0.172 0.629  0.012  9.83  13.46 
South American  0.609  0.143 0.634  0.010  12.99  13.75 
Puerto  Rican  0.569 0.375 0.632  0.027  12.12  13.80 
Cuban  0.600 0.320 0.684  0.163  13.07  13.42 
West Indies  0.712  0.315 0.640  0.018  12.00  13.87 
Hispanic  0.490 0.284 0.574  0.017  12.13  13.47 
Asian Indian  0.874  0.470 0.887  0.018  16.47  13.90 
Chinese  0.841 0.497 0.886  0.032  14.62  13.86 
Filipino  0.818 0.332 0.877  0.037  14.52  13.68 
Japanese 0.614  0.501  0.769 0.052  15.52  13.73 
Korean  0.918 0.325 0.936  0.014  15.19  13.67 
Vietnamese 0.894  0.600 0.896  0.014  12.53  13.72 
Notes: Numbers are weighted. 
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Endogamy               
 
1 2  3 4 
Years of Education  -0.009  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Age -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  -0.005 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Age Squared/100  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.008 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Cannot Speak English  0.178  0.129  0.096  0.105 
 (0.021)**  (0.020)**  (0.018)**  (0.018)** 
White -0.230  -0.182  -0.154  -0.072 
 (0.025)**  (0.014)**  (0.021)**  (0.024)** 
Asian 0.234  0.348  0.377  0.299 
 (0.027)**  (0.015)**  (0.023)**  (0.025)** 
US born  -0.269  -0.333  -0.322  -0.308 
 (0.014)**  (0.015)**  (0.016)**  (0.015)** 
Veteran status  -0.038 -0.040  -0.038  -0.037 
 (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Region dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
In metro area, central city 0.005  0.030  0.030  0.023 
 (0.012)  (0.009)**  (0.009)**  (0.008)** 
In metro, area, outside 
central city 
-0.009 0.004  0.007  0.006 
 (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004)+  (0.004)+ 
Size of Ethnic Group    2.247  2.258  2.278 
   (0.100)**  (0.105)**  (0.147)** 
Square of Size     -2.325  -2.369  -2.371 
   (0.201)**  (0.207)**  (0.250)** 
Mean Ethnic Education       -0.016  -0.016 
     (0.005)**  (0.004)** 
Mean Ethnic Education-
Mean Education 
   -0.031  -0.022 
     (0.008)**  (0.006)** 
Education X (Mean Ethnic 
Education-Mean Education) 
   0.003  0.002 
     (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
Ancestry dummies  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 681884  681884  681884  681884 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on MSA ×ancestry cells.   
  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Endogamy  US Born  Foreign Born, 
All 
Foreign Born, 
Ages 0-5 at 
Arrival 
Foreign Born, 




than 18 at 
Arrival 
Years of Education  -0.004  -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.002 
  (0.000)**  (0.001)** (0.002)  (0.002)** (0.001)** 
Age  -0.004  -0.006 -0.013 -0.016 -0.008 
  (0.001)**  (0.002)** (0.006)*  (0.005)** (0.001)** 
Age Squared/100  0.006  0.010 0.016 0.017 0.009 
  (0.001)**  (0.002)** (0.007)*  (0.006)** (0.001)** 
Cannot Speak English  0.157  0.075 0.358 0.048 0.052 
  (0.062)*  (0.009)** (0.135)** (0.025)+  (0.008)** 
White  -0.166  0.062  -0.178 -0.014 0.094 
  (0.018)**  (0.024)** (0.042)** (0.043)  (0.018)** 
Asian  0.155  0.239 0.120 0.230 0.182 
  (0.033)**  (0.021)** (0.071)+  (0.055)** (0.025)** 
Veteran status  -0.019  -0.126 -0.052 -0.019 -0.074 
  (0.002)**  (0.008)** (0.015)** (0.018)  (0.008)** 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
In metro area, central 
city 
0.016  0.001 0.002 -0.013  -0.006 
  (0.008)+  (0.007) (0.022) (0.020) (0.006) 
In metro, area, outside 
central city 
0.009  -0.008 0.004  -0.016 -0.005 
  (0.003)**  (0.004)+  (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) 
Size of Ethnic Group  2.211  1.239  1.969  1.535  0.907 
  (0.135)**  (0.092)** (0.255)** (0.166)** (0.072)** 
Square of Size   -2.336  -1.267  -1.895  -1.440  -0.924 
  (0.244)**  (0.168)** (0.402)** (0.288)** (0.129)** 
Mean Ethnic 
Education  
-0.019  -0.001 -0.042 -0.003 0.002 




-0.037  -0.023 -0.023 -0.014 -0.018 
  (0.007)**  (0.006)**  (0.020) (0.013) (0.005)** 
Education X (Mean 
Ethnic Education-
Mean Education) 
0.004  0.001 0.002 -0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.000)** 
Ancestry dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  552081  126295  8851 8397 93496 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered on MSA × ancestry cells. 
  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
 
  25Table 5. Probit Marginal Effects of Education on Endogamy by Race and Nativity.           













Years of Education  -0.004  -0.017 -0.018 -0.005  0.009 -0.001 
  (0.001)**  (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.001)**  (0.003)**  (0.000)+ 
Age  -0.004  -0.014 -0.007 -0.010  -0.037 0.005 
  (0.001)**  (0.004)** (0.004)+  (0.002)**  (0.008)** (0.002)** 
Age Squared/100  0.006  0.020 0.010 0.013  0.047 -0.003 
 (0.001)**  (0.004)**  (0.004)*  (0.003)**  (0.009)**  (0.002)+ 
Cannot Speak English  0.005  0.093    0.082    0.087 
 (0.081)  (0.051)+    (0.012)**    (0.011)** 
Veteran status  -0.018  -0.183 -0.040 -0.112  -0.026  -0.169 
  (0.002)**  (0.015)** (0.008)** (0.013)**  (0.032)  (0.010)** 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
In metro area, central 
city 
0.012  0.064 0.040 -0.016  0.094  0.016 
 (0.009)  (0.014)**  (0.017)*  (0.010)  (0.030)**  (0.010) 
In metro, area, outside 
central city 
0.009 0.009  -0.003  -0.029  0.021  -0.006 
  (0.003)**  (0.010) (0.018) (0.008)**  (0.024)  (0.008) 
Size of Ethnic Group  2.482  2.642 1.824 1.223  4.930  0.555 
  (0.183)**  (0.393)** (0.150)** (0.104)**  (2.281)*  (0.125)** 
Square of Size   -3.107  -4.470 -1.715 -1.201  -15.407  -0.250 
  (0.396)**  (1.068)** (0.219)** (0.176)**  (10.269)  (0.170) 
Mean Ethnic 
Education  
-0.018 0.011  -0.044  -0.003  -0.035  -0.011 




-0.038 -0.128  0.013  -0.020  0.115  -0.030 
 (0.009)**  (0.014)**  (0.013)  (0.009)*  (0.035)**  (0.013)* 
Education X (Mean 
Ethnic Education-
Mean Education) 
0.004  0.008 0.002 0.000  -0.005  0.001 
 (0.000)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)+  (0.000)  (0.002)**  (0.000)* 
Ancestry dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  518309  30692 23353 46904  12239  129803 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on MSA × ancestry cells.   
  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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   Spousal Differences in Years of Education 
            
      Endogamous Couples     Exogamous Couples     Difference 
           
Total   2.29   2.00    0.29 
           
Age at Arrival            
     Younger than 7    2.09   1.92    0.17 
     7 and above    2.40   2.11    0.29 
English Ability            
     Speaks only English  1.90   1.91    -0.01 
     Speaks some English  2.34   2.10    0.24 
     Does not speak English  2.81   2.31    0.49 
Size of Ethnic Group in 
MSA          
     Less than .07    2.08   2.00    0.08 
     .07 and above    2.46   1.99    0.47 
           
Race           
     White    2.03   1.95    0.09 
     Hispanic    2.46   2.08    0.38 
     Asian     1.99   1.96    0.03 
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APPENDIX B 
We keep male individuals in the age group 26 to 65, who are married and with a spouse present, who are 
not enrolled in school, and who: report one race, one ancestry (BE CAREFUL HERE, YOU KEEP 
ANCETR2 as well), live in an identifiable metro area, and in an identifiable metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA). We also restrict our sample to ancestry groups with more than 1,000 observations and to groups 
that mostly reflect the past and present waves of immigration to the U.S. We also drop individuals who 
come from countries with an English speaking background. 
 
[N.B. The definition of school includes any nursery school, kindergarten, elementary school, any schooling 
leading toward a high school diploma or college degree].    
 
Years of education (variable: yredu) 
Question: “What is the highest degree or level of school this person has completed?” Mark [X] One box. If 
currently enrolled, mark the previous grade of the highest degree achieved.  
  
Mapping of educational qualifications to years of education a la Chiswick and DebBurman (2004).  
No school completed – Zero years of education 
1
st-4
th grade (nursery school to 4
th grade) – 2.5 years 
5
th-8
th grade – 6.5 years 
9
th grade – 9 years 
10
th grade – 10 years 
11
th grade – 11 years 
12
th grade (no diploma) – 12 years 
High school graduate (high school diploma or the equivalent, for example GED) – 12 years   
Some college credit (but less than 1 year) – 13 years 
Associate degree (for example: AA, AS)– 14.5 years 
Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA, AB, BS)– 16 years 
Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, Med, MSW, MBA) – 18 years 
Professional degree (for example, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) – 22 years  
Doctorate degree (for example: PhD, EdD)  – 22 years 
  
English speaking dummy (variable: speakeng) BE CAREFUL HERE 
It indicates whether the respondent speaks only English at home, and also reports how well the respondent, 
who speaks a language other than English at home, speaks well.   
Equals to 1 if the individual does not speak English (=1, not at all) and 0 otherwise (speaks only English, 
very well, speaks well, not well).  
 
Ancestry dummies (variable: ancestr1) 
Question: “What is this person’s ancestry or ethnic origin?” 
It provides the respondent’s self-reported ancestry or ethnic origin (first response). We distinguish 34 
ancestry dummies.   
European groups: Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, 
Norwegian, Portuguese, Swedish, Swiss, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, 
Yugoslavian, Spaniard.  
Mexican groups: Mexican, Mexican American, Nuevo Mexicano. 
Hispanic groups: Hispanic, Spanish.    
Central American groups: Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Salvadorian. 
South American groups: Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian. 
West Indian groups: Dominican, Jamaican, Haitian. 
Asian groups: Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese.         
Other ancestries: Puerto Rican, Cuban. 
 
Race dummies (variables: race and hispan) 
  28We distinguish between 3 mutually exclusive race categories: Whites, Asians and Hispanics.  
 
Native born dummy (variable: bpl) 
Takes the value of 1 if the individual is U.S. born and 0 otherwise.  
 
Age of arrival 
Age of the individual minus years the individual has been in the U.S (years since migration in the U.S.).  
 
Age married 
Age of the individual minus the age of the eldest own child in the household.  
 
Veteran status dummy (variable: vetstat) 
Question: “Has this person ever served on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces, military Reserves, on 
National Guard?” Active duty does not include training fore the Reserves or National Guard, but does 
include activation, for example, for the Persian Gulf War.    
Equals to 1 if the individual if the individual served in the military forces of the U.S. (army, navy, air force, 
marine corps, or coast guard) in time of war or peace. Zero otherwise.  
 
Region dummies (variable: region) 
Nine region dummies: New England division, Middle Atlantic division, East North Central, West North 
Central, South Atlantic division, East South Central division, West South Central division, Mountain 
division, Pacific division.   
 
Metro dummies (variable: metro) 
It indicates whether the household was located within a metropolitan area. For households within 
metropolitan areas, it indicates whether the housing unit was within a metropolitan area’s central city (or 
cities), or within the remainder of the metropolitan area.   
Three metro area dummies: in metro area (central city), in metro area (outside central city), central city 
status unknown.   
 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (variable: metarea) 
Metropolitan areas are counties or combinations of counties centering on a substantial urban area. It 
identifies the metropolitan area where the household was enumerated, if that metropolitan areas was large 
enough to meet confidentiality requirements. There are 283 identifiable MSAs in our data. 
 
Size of ethnic group 
It is the ratio of the (numerator = number of individuals of each of the 34 ancestry groups in each MSA, 
denominator = number of the whole U.S. population in each MSA).   
 
Age group dummies 
Equals to 1 if in the age group 26 to 35, 0 otherwise.  
Equals to 1 if in the age group 36 to 45, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if in the age group 46 to 55, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if in the age group 56 to 65, 0 otherwise. 
 
Cohort group dummies 
Equals to 1 if the individual arrived between 1940-1949, 0 otherwise.  
Equals to 1 if the individual arrived between 1950-1959, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if the individual arrived between 1960-1969, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if the individual arrived between 1970-1979, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if the individual arrived between 1980-1989, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if the individual arrived between 1990-1999, 0 otherwise. 
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Census year dummies 
Equals to 1 if the observation is in the 2000 Census, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if the observation is in the 1990 Census, 0 otherwise. 
Equals to 1 if the observation is in the 1980 Census, 0 otherwise. 
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